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Introduction 
The principle of autonomy (hereafter Prince Auto) is a doctrine which commits 
physicalistic philosophers to mechanical explanations of human behaviour. In this 
paper I argue that physicalism (in all its forms) presents a much too narrow account of 
scientific explanation. If we are to develop an adequate philosophy of psychology we 
must first free ourselves from the rule of a metaphysical picture which has dominated 
philosophy since at least the time of Descartes. We must free ourselves from the reign 
of Prince Auto. 
(i) Royal Descent 
Who is this Prince Auto who has ruled modern thinking of late? He is a slippery 
character who appears in many different guises; Fodor calls him methodological 
solipsism1, Burge calls him individualism2, but it was Stich who dubbed him the 
Principle of Autonomy.3 Dennett4 bends knee to him when he argues that physical 
stance predictions supreme and, to a still lesser extent, Davidson pays more limited 
homage with his proposal of psyhcophysical supervenience5. Prince Auto's central 
decree is that when we are engaging in a serious psychology we should be concerned 
only with the internal, efficient causes of behaviour. Or put another way, in doing 
psychology, we must discover what is inside the agent that is the immediate or 
proximate cause of its taking the action it does. He also says that anyone who does not 
pay him homage is not engaged in true or serious science. Let us quickly sketch the 
line of descent of our illustrious monarch. 
Prince Auto succeeded to the explanatory throne during the seventeenth century when 
he replaced the ageing monarch Prince Telos. Prince Telos' decree was that in the 
explanation of all behaviour, both animate and inanimate, we should look for the 
purpose or end of the behaviour. While Auto emphasised efficient causes, Telos 
concentrated on final causes. Prince Telos was the ruler of the scholastics. And as we 
know it was these very scholastics who became the principal opponents of 
Renaissance science. Their failure in the competition with the new science in the 
explanation of the behaviour of inanimate objects brought a general disgrace to all 
teleological explanations. 
The first damaging challenge to Prince Telos' rule came in 1543 when Copernicus' 
cosmological theory was first published. But the teleological world-view was must 
seriously challenged by Galileo, who became Prince Telos' principal opponent in the 
debate about falling-bodies. As we know the scholastics lost their duel with Galileo. 
Russell sums up the failures of teleological explanation by saying "though it might 
well seem admirably suited to explain the growth of animals and plants, it became in 
the event, a great obstacle to the progress of science" (Russell, 1945, p. 205, emphasis 
mine). Behind Russell's words we can see the attitude which is also present in the 
minds of modern physicalists who think that only mechanical explanations are 
scientific. This is attitude stems from Prince Auto's influence. 
In his discussion of the history of physics, March announces that "The next major 
contribution to the development of mechanics came from the French philosopher 
Rene Descartes...His goal was to construct a general philosophy, as a replacement to 
that of the scholastics, by means of his own meditations and analytic methods that 
place great emphases on the discovery and use of first principles" (March, 1978, p. 
27). It is crucial to an understanding of today's problems in the philosophy of 
psychology that we do not forget that while Descartes was laying down the 
foundations for talk of mental phenomena he was also contributing to the 
development of classical physics. 
"[He] did develop his physics, a physics that is, at least in principle, nothing less than 
applied mathematics, or mechanics; a physics based on the clear and distinct ideas of 
extension and motion, a physics that reduces all material being to an endless interplay 
of movements, governed by strict mathematical laws, in the uniform space of the 
infinite universe" (Anscombe and Geach, 1969, p. xxviii). 
We know that classical physics is a science which has gone on to achieve great 
success in its own domain. We also know that this new science of mechanics 
ascended to the throne partly by deposing Prince Telos' final cause explanations of the 
movements of matter. That is why for Descartes, and most thinkers of the seventeenth 
century, all matter was to be treated alike - and all explanations of the motion and 
behaviour of physical bodies could be described in purely mathematical terms. 
Descartes, under the sway of Prince Auto, thought of animals and all biological 
entities, including human bodies, as wholly mechanical. For him what separated 
humans from the beasts was to be found in their thinking essences.6 
Modern physicalists are not very different from Descartes in this matter. They differ 
only in having dropped the thesis that there are separate entities, or substances, called 
minds. If there are any mental events then they must be physical in nature. Realists, 
who generally subscribe to psycho-functionalism or physicalism, obey Prince Auto by 
forcing the body to cast off its mental ectoplasm. Anti-realists, whether strong or 
weak, deny that mental entities have any reality rights at all, since content and 
consciousness cannot be squared with an ontology of purely physical entities, 
properties and relations . Thus, all physicalists feel the pressure to justify incorporate, 
e.g. modify, or deny the mental. In this physicalism is governed by the metaphysical 
monarch who has sat on the imperial throne of explanation since the seventeenth 
century. 
What this simplistic historical sketch reminds us is the kind of difficulty that has 
arisen, in part, because Prince Telos is no longer respected on questions of matter and 
motion. His decree was disobeyed to allow for the birth of seventeenth century 
Renaissance science. While the teleological world view failed to provide a sound 
basis for all forms of explanation, it is important to query the unquestioned 
assumption that lies at the heart of modern physicalism which is that explanations 
should only respect only one master; since Prince Telos has been discredited, he has 
be replaced entirely by Prince Auto. This is the move that crucially needs to be 
challenged. For if we adopt a physicalist point of view we will not only misrepresent 
the nature of psychology but also the nature of scientific explanation. 
(ii) The Argument from Biology 
The argument from science goes something like this; The physicalist likes to suggest 
that if we are agreed that there is nothing magical about the causes of action then we 
must admit that the immediate, efficient causes of action must be an internal physical 
event. This, so far, is just a statement of a commitment to the mechanistic world-view; 
a pledge of allegiance, if you like.  
They also hold that to deny that reasons are, or are reducible to, mechanical causes is 
to be in conflict with the scientific world view. This conclusion derives from the 
allegedly undeniable truth that all modern of science is ultimately causal/explanatory 
in nature. Therefore, if we cannot describe reasons in terms of causes either 
straightforwardly or by appeal to a suitable notion of supervenience, then we must 
abandon reasoned explanations of actions altogether and seek a more appropriate 
causal explanation.7 If this worst case scenario should be realised our quandary would 
be: to be true to our selves or our science. Never the twain shall meet. Taking any 
other view would be to hold that our actions are necessarily mysterious. But it is 
crucial to this way of presenting matters that one accepts that the only proper 
scientific explanations are thus given in terms of efficient and proximate causes. 
But surely this is not the case. After all, even some domains of modern physics rebel 
against the picture of causal determination - as Rosenberg tells us "Quantum 
mechanics rests on the rejection of a Newtonian principle that physicists and 
philosophers have spent two hundred years attempting to prove as a necessary truth of 
metaphysics" (Rosenberg, 1985, p. 7). To establish this would be enough to 
demonstrate that the physicalist claim concerning the link between mechanistic 
explanations and scientific respectability is undermined. 
However, more relevant to the explanation of action is the fact that if we accept the 
physicalist criteria of scientific respectability we would have to hold that the majority 
of the biological sciences, i.e. those that rely on teleofunctional explanations, are not 
in good standing. As Gasper says, "biology is the best example we have of 
nonphysical science" (Gasper, 1991, p. 545, cf. Rosenberg, 1985, p. 13, 28, 32). But 
why is biology thought to be an exemplar of nonphysical science? It is, as Mayr 
suggests, because "The most characteristic aspect of evolutionary biology are the 
questions it asks. Instead of concentrating on what? and how? as does the biology of 
proximate causes, it asks why? ... [and t]he question 'why?' in the sense of 'what for' is 
meaningless in the world of inanimate objects" (Mayr, 1981, p. 72-73). Or in the 
words of John Maynard-Smith "[a biologist] asks not only how it works, but what is it 
for. This sharply distinguishes biology from physics and chemistry" (Maynard-Smith, 
1990, p. 65). If it is true that teleofunctional explanations of this sort are not 
mechanical explanations, and that biology, of need, employs such explanations, then 
Mayr is right to conclude that "the assumption of ... naive mechanists that biology 
consists entirely of proximate causes is demonstrably wrong" (Mayr, 1981, p. 73). 
If presented with this case, it is open for the physicalist to argue in one of three ways. 
Firstly, they could deny that biology really trades in such explanations at all. 
Secondly, they could deny the claim that functional explanations are irreducible to 
mechanical explanations. Thirdly, they could concede the impossibility of such a 
reduction, but nevertheless maintain that in itself this only provides evidence that 
biology is not a respectable science. None of these responses is satisfactory. I will not 
here give any attention to the first but I will examine the other two in turn. 
Let us consider the second reply first. This is to adopt a strategy of reductive 
provincialism according to which the physicalist admits that biology and mechanical 
science do appear differ significantly in the explanations which they provide but, 
despite this they claim that with the introduction of bridge or reducing laws the 
explanatory value of biological theories can be preserved and captured by a more 
comprehensive, lower level science. However there are special problems, in principle, 
when it comes to the reduction of biological science, particularly evolutionary 
biology. I wish to draw attention to the three most important. 
First, strong reduction requires that the higher level theory mirco-reduce via bridge 
laws to the lower level theory. But as J.J.C. Smart points out "there are no biological 
theories, in [the sense of close-knit theories of physics and chemistry] and not even 
biological laws. (Though there are biological generalisations)" (Smart, 1961, p. 50). If 
this is true, that is if teleofunctional explanations resist axiomisation, then there are no 
laws to reduce. 
Second, another obstruction to this programme is that evolutionary biology, at least, 
does not admit of natural kinds (this is one of the reasons that there are no universal 
laws). As Hull puts it "biological species in general are best viewed as historical 
entities, not as they have been traditionally interpreted as natural kinds" (Hull, 1984, 
p. 19, Rosenberg, 1985, ch. 7, Mayr, 1981, p. 55-57, Dupre, 1983, p. 326-327, 342). 
In evolutionary theory species are quantified over and defined in terms of historical 
lineage. Hull says "The point I wish to argue is that genes, organisms and species, as 
they function in evolutionary processes, are necessarily spatiotemporally localised 
individuals. They could not perform the functions which they perform if they were 
not" (Hull, 1994, p. 195). He also insists that species names, as they appear in 
evolutionary theory, are best understood as proper names and claims "A taxon has the 
name it has in virtue of the naming ceremony, not in virtue of any trait or traits it 
might have" (Hull, 1994, p. 206) The point is that there can be no bridge laws if there 
are no natural kinds of the traditional sort to which such laws apply. 
Third, the reductionist programme insists that the lower level theory holds all the 
explanatory cards, but explanation is not unidirectional in evolutionary biology. As 
Kitcher points out, "[u]nderstanding the phenotypic manifestation of a gene, [anti-
reductionists] will maintain requires constant shifting back and forth across levels ... 
one sometimes uses descriptions at higher levels to explain a more fundamental level" 
(Kitcher, 1991, p. 568-569). 
Still, some areas of biology are more susceptible than others to reduction. Successes 
within the area of molecular biology have often encouraged reductionists. But given 
that "molecular studies cannot cannibalize the rest of biology" Kitcher, 1991, p. 569) 
unless we are given some reason to think that teleofunctional explanations can be so 
reduced we must reject reductive provincialism. 
The third physicalist reply is to sponsor some form of eliminative provincialism. This 
is the most dramatic response as it attempts to deny that biology is a proper science. 
The argument is simple and suggests that if biology fails to reduce because it lacks 
proper laws then it is not of the right character to be considered a science. Eliminative 
provincialists say of biology that "Its credentials as a natural science are not in order" 
(Rosenberg, 1985, p. 33). The counter claim is simply that "animals and men are very 
complicated mechanisms" (Smart, 1961, p. 50). But to date there have been no 
mechanical laws proposed which could be applied usefully and universally to living 
creatures. And without such laws the bold statement that the behaviour of animals and 
men should only be explained mechanically is nothing other than sheer prescription. 
We might have reason to take this claim seriously if it were supported by some 
convincing argument that physics, and only physics, yielded objective truth. Such an 
argument, however, would need to show that the categories of truth and reference 
were scientifically respectable in the narrow terms permitted by the reductive 
provincalist. Therefore, it is not an argument open to physicalist who supports any 
form of eliminativism or instrumentalism about the 'mental'. Nor can it be put forward 
persuasively by an intentional realist without some detailed account of how 
intentional phenomena (in general) can be incorporated into the causal-mechanical 
world view.8  
Until reductive and eliminative provincialists can meet these objections the most 
reasonable response, which has been adopted by many post-positivist philosophers of 
science, is to accept that the many biological sciences are scientifically respectable 
despite the fact that they employ different kinds of explanations from that of the 
causal-mechanical sciences. One can simply hold that teleofunctional explanation in 
biology is autonomous; and this implies, contra physicalist claims, that mechanical 
explanation is not the only type of explanation, scientific or otherwise. It is because I 
am persuaded of this view that I hold that the arguments in favour of methodological 
solipsism, individualism, and the principle of autonomy all rest on a limited 
understanding of the nature of scientific explanation. 
When an evolutionary biologist explains the behaviour or evolution of particular 
phenotypic property of an organism he is perfectly entitled to make use of the external 
features of the world; such as the organism's the evolutionary history and 
environment. In fact, their explanation wouldn't be worth much if they didn't. It is 
useful to ask: Why should psychologists be any more limited in the scope of their 
scientifically respectable explanations in this regard (cf. Millikan, 1993)? Why should 
we limit our explanations to the internal causes of behaviour or adopt elaborate, 
epicyclical theories designed to ensure that we have not done insult or injury to 
explanations in terms of causal-mechanical laws? If the answer is simply that we wish 
to be scientifically respectable then this is no answer at all. Science is more than 
classical mechanics. 
Against this background it may seem surprising that physicalism has had the 
overwhelming popularity it has and escaped serious scrutiny for so long. For example, 
Sober tells us "Biologists are often surprised to learn how little Darwinism has 
influenced philosophy of science in that last one hundred years. They frequently think 
that the philosophical consequences of evolutionary theory must be so profound that 
philosophers have chosen to stick there heads in the sand" Sober (1985, pp. 5-6). But 
he admits this analysis of the situation is not really not fair because "[p]hilosophers 
now assimilate the fact of evolution with as little difficulty as the fact the earth is not 
the centre of the solar system ... [but the source of the problem is that] ... philosophy 
of science this century has been shaped by an interest in physics and mathematics" 
Sober (1985, p. 6).9 And in another, hopeful and sobering quotation, he remarks: "It 
remains to be seen how radically the philosophy of science will be reinterpreted" 
Sober (1985, p. 7). 
Physicalism, with its emphasis on the methods and explanations of mechanical 
science is just as limited and one-sided as the Scholastic provincialism which insisted 
that teleological explanations applied to all things. Given the difficulties with 
reductionism and the inappropriate nature of physics with regard to the explanation in 
many areas of biology we would be well-advised to adopt the pragmatic strategy of 
recognising a plurality of scientific methods and explanations. We must bear in mind 
that different explanatory strategies will be appropriate to different subject matters. 
No single science can, or should, claim supremacy in all areas of explanation. 
(iii) Neo-Aristotelianism 
Aristotle gave us the idea of four different types of causal explanations, efficient, 
formal, material, and final, because he realised by considering the accounts proposed 
by his predecessors that any singular explanation would be inadequate. It would not 
tally with our varied deployment of the notion of cause in our explanations.10 Thus, 
he maintained that we must concentrate our attention on one type or the other 
depending upon which type of question we wish to answer. No single response could 
fully explain why something really happened. No single type of explanation could 
claim supremacy (but he did believe that explanations in terms of final causes were 
the most important).  
Even in ordinary case we find evidence for this. No single response to the question 
'Why is the bird doing that?' makes sense without a relation to a context of inquiry. 
For instance, I might answer by saying its brain processes are causing the muscular 
operations in its wings. If I answered you thus, while we were out hunting, I would 
either have misunderstood your question or I might be making a joke.11 This does not 
necessarily make the reply incorrect only inappropriate. It is inappropriate relative to 
the purpose for which you sought the explanation. Unless one is alert to this, one will 
misconstrue the nature of explanation. In any event, once we realise that there can be 
more than one response to 'Why-questions', and that these responses need not be in 
competition it will become clear that physicalism is too parochial on this score. As 
Ryle suggested long ago "Mechanism seemed to be a menace because it was assumed 
that the use of these terms in mechanical theories was their sole use; and that all 'why' 
questions are answerable in terms of laws of motion" (Ryle, 1949, p. 79). 
There is bound to be an outcry from enraged physicalists. "What you done to our 
Prince?" In my book, Prince Auto is a seventeenth century tyrant. Why should we 
limit our explanations of behaviour to efficient or proximate causes inside the skin of 
the agent? Of course internal causes play a crucial role in making behaviour and 
action possible but why should we limit our explanations to such causes alone? Where 
are the physicalist arguments to show that a serious psychology must limit itself in 
this way? 
It is not through a philosophical referendum that physicalism crowned Prince Auto. 
He was crowned when classic physics became successful in the domain of explaining 
and predicting the behaviour of inanimate objects. But to concentrate on his 
achievements in this domain alone and insist, on this basis, that he should rule all 
others generates a one-sided view of the nature of scientific explanation. If you begin 
your philosophy of mind with Descartes it is likely you begin your philosophy of 
science with Descartes as well, in spirit at least. That means you will probably think 
that if your view is to be scientifically respectable it must (not just can) describe all 
things mechanistically - all bodies must be mere automata.  
We must depose this tyrannical despot who has ruined our philosophical crops for the 
past three centuries. And in his place I would urge that we do not put another 
monarch. It is time for a more democratic and liberal explanatory leader - one which 
recognises autonomous contexts of inquiry. We must not react against mechanism the 
way mechanists reacted against teleology. Relative to a particular context of inquiry 
we can expect physics, the biological sciences and descriptive anthropology to play 
important and useful roles. We might even speak of human contexts of inquiry to 
remind ourselves that even the sciences themselves are dependent upon human culture 
and society. Our scientific and philosophical foundations are cultural not physical - 
human society is our given. Having said this, I wish to separate myself from those 
who would make linguistic or conceptual analysis their end point - for that, I believe, 
is to err too far in the other direction. Some questions simply are not about human 
culture and language although all questions stem from it. 
However, resistance to what I will tentatively call Neo-Aristotelianism about 
explanation is provoked by the fact that philosophers and scientists alike believe that 
physics should have ontological supremacy even if does not have explanatory 
supremacy. It is for this reason that many philosophers of biology who accept the 
autonomy of biological explanations still hold that physics is the final arbitrator of all 
ontology. This is because no self-respecting biologist wishes to be accused of vitalism 
(Mayr, 1981, p. 60, 63-64, Kitcher, 1991, p. 567, Rosenberg, 1985, p. 24-25, Gasper, 
1991, p. 546, Hull, 1984, p. 31). However even if we recognise that there are different 
types of explanation it is simply open for us to accept a physicalist ontology - or so it 
may seem. But this is a course I no longer recommend.12 For without any 
methodological or explanatory unity between physics and biology, such a 
commitment looks like nothing other than an unwarranted pledge of ontological 
allegiance. In Putnam's terms it is metaphysical comfort. Rosenberg notes this as well. 
"To conclude that all living systems are merely macromolecules in motion would be a 
merely spiritual consolation to materialist biologists if there are practically 
insuperable obstacles to explaining any part of their behaviour with all the power and 
precision that physics brings to bear on non-living things" (Rosenberg, 1985, p. 29). 
But if we deny the metaphysics of physicalism are we not thereby committed to 
vitalism or dualism? No. Especially not if one views scientific theories pragmatically 
and instrumentally. If we are not convinced by the claims of scientific realists then we 
need not be committed to vitalism in holding that the biological sciences, or 
commonsense psychology for that matter, are autonomous. A pluralist about 
explanation could hold that ontology is not objective in any case; they might hold that 
ontology is always relative to a theory or scheme. With these caveats in place I wish 
to look briefly at two different contexts of inquiry. 
(iv) Teleology Revisited 
Responses to the problem of explaining representational content have taken a 
promising turn in recent years. Many philosophers of psychology are turning away 
from the constraints of purely mechanistic theories of content towards the 
teleologically-based accounts. We can see this swing of attention in the recent work 
of Dretske (1988, 1990), McGinn (1989), Millikan (1984-1989), Van Gulick (1990) 
and Papineau (1984, 1987) 
However, Fodor (1990) makes what appears to be a strong attack on teleological 
attempts to explain content. As he sees it they suffer from an inability to resolve what 
he call the disjunction problem.13 The disjunction problem arises because if one 
holds that the meaning of a subject's mental symbols covary lawfully with the 
external causes of such tokenings then whatever causes such tokenings must be 
included in the meaning. An example will help make this clearer. Mahoney tells the 
story in relation to thinking that "FELIX IS A CAT" on one particular evening. He is 
sitting watching television when his dog, Fido, rushes through the room. But it is dark 
and as far as he can tell it was Felix his cat that passed by. In fact, Fido causes him, in 
this case to think of Felix. And this generates the disjunction problem. 
"For the point of a causal semantics of the mind is that a mental representation means 
whatever is its reliable cause. Since Felix's being a cat or Fido's being a dog is a more 
reliable cause of 'FELIX IS A CAT' than is Felix's being a cat, the content of 'FELIX 
IS A CAT' ought - by the causal theory's lights - to be that Felix is a cat or Fido is a 
dog [the disjunction]. And with but a little nudge it now follows from the causal 
theory that, though contrary to fact, simple mental representations can never 
misrepresent" (Mahoney, p. 4, emphasis added) 
As Baker points out "the disjunction problem, first identified by Fodor himself, is 
both deep and pervasive" (Baker, 1991, p. 29). But, for whom? As Mahoney makes 
clear that it is a problem for defenders of crude causal theories of content. And I have 
already argued that to employ a purely causal account in the explanation of animal 
behaviour would be inappropriate. We must agree with Millikan in thinking that "on a 
teleological analysis, the belief box will have to be defined by its teleofunction, not by 
its causal disposition, not by its mechanofucntion" (Millikan, 1991, p. 156).  
We need to ask our questions about the purpose or functions of representations in the 
context of the larger role they play in an organism's response. Why is this so? Take 
the infamous case of a frog who can't tell the difference between flies, black dots, 
flee-bees, or bee-bees. In cases of what we would consider error the frog has failed to 
distinguish between what we know to be nutritious and what is not. And we can give 
an account from evolutionary theory to further explain what it was in the past that 
caused this targetted response in the frog's ancestors to be selected and handed down. 
It is directed at flies and nothing else because only the consumption of flies will have 
benefited these creatures. Given its stomach-design, as per his lineage, the frog's 
tongue-action should be directed at flies. If he snaps at a black dot something has 
gone wrong from the historical point of view. The teleological approach allows us to 
define error by contrasting what the frog's is currently directed at (in extension) and 
contrast this with what it is supposed to be directed at. The later is decided by appeal 
to the evolutionary history and natural environment of the organism's forefathers. In 
short, perceptual error, of this sort, is best explained teleologically, where such 
teleology is historically described by the organism's evolutionary background. 
Fodor is wrong to attack teleological accounts with the disjunction problem. 
Disjunction is a problem for those who support causal theories of content. It 
eloquently reveals the inadequacy of such accounts by exposing the fact that they 
leave no room for normative concepts such as error. And even Fodor admits the 
teleological story "is sensitive to the plausible intuition that errors are cases where 
something has gone wrong". Nevertheless, as Kim Sterenly who is convinced that 
teleological accounts are the right story to tell about content, recently writes "[i]t is 
one thing to give teleological accounts of innate structures; quite another to give 
teleological accounts of the propositional attitudes" (Sterenly 1990, p. 128).14 This is 
well observed. 
(v) Humanity Revisited 
I have argued that relative to certain contexts of inquiry mechanical and teleological 
explanations are pragmatically useful - but ultimately, I believe, that they are both 
inappropriate when employed as models for full-fledged explanations of human 
action. Some inclined towards causalism will argue, immediately, that there is a 
serious problem in this response which has nothing to do with science. For they hold 
that in ordinary language we do speak of beliefs and desires as being causally 
efficacious. They say that any examination of ordinary discourse shows that reasons 
are causes - especially if cause is to mean, as it does in the Oxford English Dictionary, 
"what produces an effect". For example; 
Why did you hit that man? I thought he was poking fun at me and I wanted to teach 
him a lesson. 
Why did you eat that cake? I wanted some chocolate and I thought the icing was 
chocolate.  
These are paradigms of causal explanations if, by causal, we mean "what made 
something happen". 
That we talk in this way and give these types of explanation is, I agree, beyond 
dispute. But this, in and of itself, does not mean that the causalist conclusion is 
correct. As I have already pointed out, Aristotle noted we use the concept of cause in 
different ways. This was in part an observation about everyday usage. One has but to 
examine the way in which the terms are used in these cases to discover that there is a 
difference between our talk of reasons and our talk of causes in the strict, mechanical 
sense. As Medlen says, "It is certainly true that we use 'cause' in speaking about the 
actions of agents, but we can no more infer from this verbal consideration that actions 
are the Humean effects of events than we can from the etymological derivation of the 
term 'motive'" (Melden, 1961, p. 208) 
What is overlooked by the causalist is that there are "two quite different senses in 
which we say that it happened 'because' so and so was the case" (Ryle, 1949, p. 89). 
Thus, "When we ask 'Why did someone act in a certain way?' this question might, so 
far as its language goes, either be an inquiry into the cause of his acting in that way, 
or be an inquiry into the character of the agent which accounts for his having acted in 
that way on that occasion" (Ryle, [1949, p. 89]). To cite the first type of response is to 
cite a cause, to cite the second type of response is to cite a reason. As Melden notes 
"What this comes down to is that if we say that certain muscle movements take place 
- this is how the arm gets raised ... we are not so much saying what the agent is doing 
as describing what is taking place" (Melden, 1961, p. 24). A physiologically 
indistinguishable arm movement could occur in a number of different contexts. I 
might be raising my arm on one occasion in order to answer a question, to get my hat 
from a high shelf, to wave to my friend, or to signal to my enemy to cease. Such 
contexts make all the difference to how we describe and explain the action when we 
speak of reasons. Viewed narrowly the physical movements, the efficient, proximate 
causes of my behaviour, are of no interest to us in the context of inquiry that asks 
after reasons. We could imagine our physiology was underpinned by an alternative 
physics with a different ontology and it would have no effect on the reasoned-
explanation. Mele recently (1992) reminds us of the important distinction between 
narrow and broad behaviour. Narrow behaviour for him "is mere bodily motion, in 
abstraction from its causes and effects" (Mele, 1992, p. 18); broad behaviour takes 
into account the subject's environment, history and the context of his behaviour. He 
gives a host of examples to support this distinction. I will cite only one.15 
"When I unlocked my office door this morning, I moved my right arm, wrist, and 
hand in some determinate way or other. However, those motions themselves, in 
abstraction from their relations to other things, do not constitute my action of 
unlocking my office door. Precisely those motions, narrowly construed, might have 
occurred without my having unlocked my office door." (Mele, 1992, pp. 17-18) 
Citing a cause for my movements is not the same as citing a reason for my action. The 
fact that we can offer both explanations in the same situation by giving different 
answers to what is apparently the same why-question indicates that reasoned 
explanations and causal explanations is what is apt to confuse us. As Wittgenstein 
points out, "[t]he difference between the grammars of 'reason' and 'cause' is quite 
similar to that between the grammars of 'motive' and 'cause' ... [t]he double use of the 
word 'why', when asking for the cause and asking for the motive, together with the 
idea that we can know, and not only conjecture, our motives, gives rise to the 
confusion that a motive is a cause" (Wittgenstein, 1958, p. 15). But he also notes the 
further difference that to cite a reason for our action involves no hypothetical 
inference, no knowledge of the inner workings of our bodies. But to offer a causal 
explanation, in the mechanical sense, is in contrast precisely a conjecture; a 
hypothesis. Nor will it help to think of reason explanations as a kind of 
teleofunctional explanation. It would be as great a mistake to employ biological or 
evolutionary explanations to full-fledged human action as it would to attempt to 
employ mechanical explanations to fully explain the behaviour of animals. For as 
Fodor critically inquires of the ambitious teleofunctionalist "[Does] doubting that the 
Dodgers will ever move back to Brooklyn have a Normal function[?]".16 Beliefs 
about the Dodgers have a particularly cultural flavour and we must treat them as such. 
To understand what I mean when I air a doubt about the Dodgers you have to 
understand a great deal about baseball, New York, and so on. You will not understand 
the content of this doubt by concentrating on my biological functions any better than 
you will by focusing on the proximate, physiological causes. 
What would license us to seriously suppose that every belief or desire that we 
currently harbour has a function which was selected for a particular biological and 
survival related function? It would be a mistake for those sympathetic to 
teleofunctional accounts of basic intentionality to confuse the aspects of mind that 
concern the cultural and social with those that are best explained by the evolutionary 
sciences. A great deal of human action and behaviour cannot be understood, let alone 
explained, in terms of direct, unique biological ends. To force a harness on such 
explanations, as might be attempted by sociobiologists, is comparable to mechanist 
attempts to explain in strictly causal terms. 
What is crucial to notice about reasons, and human attitudes in general, is that without 
a human context they are inappropriate. It is for this reason that Melden says "Here I 
can only repeat that these locutions are intelligibly employed only in the context of 
human action" (Melden, 1961, p. 216). Or in Ryle's words "An action on the part of 
one agent could not have be one of spying or applauding, unless it had to do with the 
actions of another agent; nor could I behave as a customer, unless you or someone 
behaved as a seller" (Ryle, 1949, p. 191). Consider again the case of the arm-raising 
as cited by Melden: 
We need to know, in short, that we have an agent, a motorist, who is driving 
and whose action of raising the arm is to be understood in terms of the 
appropriate rule of the road as a case of signaling a turn as the crossroad 
comes into view. But in that case we have left behind all reference to 
hypothetical occurrences in the nervous system, for now we are back to the 
scene of human action (Melden, 1961, p. 210). 
In the light of such cases we are able to see where our starting points are. We know 
what it takes to be a buyer or a law abiding motorist, and this is what allows us to 
explain our behaviour in the light of reasons. There is no scientific hypothesis here 
which will tell me the real reason I am writing this very page. Unless very much 
deceived I know why I am doing it already - there is no need to guess. If I advance a 
scientific hypothesis about the causes of my fingers tapping the keys I would be 
giving a very different response to the question "Why are you doing that?". 
Here nothing is hidden; it is because I understand him, not because I am aware 
of events transpiring in some alleged mechanism of his mind or body, that I 
am able to say what he will do (Melden, 1961, p. 208). 
We need to put the emphasis in the right place in our inquires into human behaviour. 
We must remind ourselves of the purpose of our explanations. Reasons are not 
mechanically identifiable causes. Nor are they rational ones. They are not biological 
functions or dispositions. They are explanations that appeal to our character and 
situation and they depend on a cultural context. When we cite the reason for 
someone's behaviour we are not interested in the penultimate causal factor in the 
series as we might if we were seeking a purely mechanical explanation. Nor are we 
interested in a person's biology. We are interested in the person. We must remind 
ourselves of the purposes for which we seek explanations. I hope in that doing so we 
are also reminded that that we are not mere machines after all. And although we are 
animals, we are not only such. 
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ENDNOTES  
1 Fodor describes methodological solipsism in Fodor (1981, p. 239) but denies that it 
is identical to Prince Auto in Fodor (1987, p. 42). Despite this it is clear enough that 
the spirit of central decree is the same. 
2 cf. Burge (1986, pp. 3-4). 
3 Stich (1982, p. 197) and (1990, p. 348).  
4 Dennett (1985), (1987), (1991).  
5 Davidson (1980). 
6 "The mechanical outlook is as noticeable in biology as in physical science during 
the 17th century. The tendency was to regard living things, particularly animals, as 
machines - to study them with reference to the new principles of hydrostatics and 
dynamics...Descartes regarded the bodies of men and animals as nothing more than 
elaborate machines, entirely subject to physical law." (Hull, HPS, p. 270). 
7 cf. Stich (1983, 1990), Churchland (1987), Fodor (1968, 1975), Dennett (1985), 
Davidson (1980). 
8 Putnam makes these points quite strongly in Putnam (1989). 
9 Descartes great achievements in science lie in physics not biology. Thus it should 
not really surprise thinkers like Dawkins that "[p]hilosophy and the subjects known as 
'humanities' are taught almost as if Darwin had never lived" (Dawkins, 1989, p. 1).  
10 "...the truth is that the doctrine of the four causes does not consist in a recondite 
theory of fundamental metaphysical principles...we are in fact confronted with the 
results of an analysis of linguistic usage. Cause (aition) has several meanings in 
ordinary usage (195a29). Strictly speaking, therefore, we are dealing here not with 
four causes, but with four senses in which we speak of causes." (Wieland, 1975, p. 
147). 
11 Think of the old joke "Why did the chicken cross the road?". What makes it 
possible to give more than one answer to this question. As Wittgenstein says " - Let 
us ask ourselves: why do we feel a grammatical joke to be deep? (And that is what the 
depth of philosophy is.)" (Wittgenstein, PI 111). 
12 I wrongly favoured this response in Hutto (1991). 
13 Fodor, (1990, p. 71). 
14 As Stich tells us, that "we cannot conclude that evolution will result in systems that 
are optimally well designed (or nearly so)". This is so because according to 
evolutionary theory nature is frugal - if there is no pressure to develop a perceptual 
system to discriminate between flies and black dots then such a perceptual ability will 
not be selected. Or put another way, frogs with this crude perceptual mechanism will 
do no worse than frogs with a more sophisticated perceptual ability in environments 
where flies are not generally black dots. 
15 Mele gives many more such examples in Ch. 1 of Springs of Action. Another good 
example of the same narrow behaviour differing from broad behaviour can be found 
in Melden's example of the boy who can be described as both voluntarily and 
involuntarily surrendering himself to the police, depending on perspective we adopt 
(cf, Melden, 1961, pp. 219-221)  
16 Fodor (1990, p. 65). 
 
